Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 25

Issue 4

Article 4

September 1947

Discussion of Recent Decisions
J. C. Gregory
I. D. Fasman
W. A. Heindl
R. C. Montgomery
E. B. Stroh

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
J. C. Gregory, I. D. Fasman, W. A. Heindl, R. C. Montgomery & E. B. Stroh, Discussion of Recent Decisions,
25 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 329 (1947).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol25/iss4/4

This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu,
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
PUBLISHED DECEMBER, MARCH, JUNE AND SEPTEMBER BY THE STUDENTS OF
CHICAGO-KENT COLLEGE OF LAW, 10 N. FRANKLIN ST., CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
Subscription price, $2.00 per year

Single copies, 75c

Foreign subscription, $2.50

EDITORIAL BOARD

Editor-in-Chiel
W. A. HEINDL
Associate Editor
E. W. JACKSON

STAFF
Miss A. 'M. HARVEY
H. 1P. JENNINGS

S. A. IALATO
R. H. YOUNG

Case Editors

I. D.

FASMAN
J. C. GREGORY

It. C. MONTGOMERY
C. J. PRArT

E. B. STROH

L. C. TRAEGER

BOARD OF MANAGERS
WM. F. ZACHARIAS, Chairman and Faculty Adviser
KATHERINE D. AGAR HUMPHREY M. BARBOUR DONALD CAMPBELL JA.%IES R. HEMINGWAY
The College assumes no responsibility for any statement
appearing in the columns of the REVIEw.
VOLUME 25

SEPTEMBER, 1.947

NUmBER 4

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
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STATES ON WAY TO POST IS IMMUNE FROM SERVICE OF CIVIL

PRoCESs-The federal district court decision in Bergman v. De Sieyes'
may possess an effect and an importance which may become the more
greatly appreciated as innovations in international co-operation and advancements in trans-world transportation become accepted facts. The defendant therein was the duly accredited Minister of the Republic of
France to the Republic of Bolivia. En route from France to his post in
1 71 F. Supp. 334 (S. D., N. Y., 1946).
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Bolivia, he travelled by way of New York. While awaiting transportation there, he was served with civil process in an action instituted by
plaintiff. Defendant answered by claiming immunity from service by
reason of his status. Plaintiff moved to strike the defendant's answer
and contended that, under the provisions of a federal statute regulating
foreign relations, 2 defendant was not immune as he was not then an
ambassador or foreign minister who had been received as such by the
President of the United States. Plaintiff's motion was denied when the
court held that not only is a foreign minister immune from the jurisdiction, both civil and criminal, of the courts in the country to which he
is accredited but also that a foreign minister en route, either to or from
his post in another country, is likewise entitled to immunity in the
countries through which he passes. In setting down this principle, the
court found it unnecessary to interpret the federal statute as the case
did not fall within its terms. Instead, the court stated that the theory
behind the rule of international law granting immunity to accredited
diplomats at their posts of duty was equally applicable to situations as that
presented by the facts of the case before it, for to hold otherwise might
seriously hamper the travelling diplomat in the performance of his duty
to fulfill his mission and might disrupt the friendly relations between his
country and the country to which he had been assigned.
Cases squarely on point with the instant one are rare, relatively
speaking, as compared to those which involve service of civil process upon
a diplomat in the country to which he is accredited.3 One of the earliest
on record, that of Holbrook, Nelson & Company v. Henderson,4 involved
the person of the Minister of the Republic of Texas, duly accredited to
France and England, who, while passing through New York en route to
Texas with a treaty between the French government and his own, was arrested under civil process. His application to be discharged was granted
by a court which cited freely from Vattel's treatise on international law
and adopted the latter's theory that ambassadors passing through friendly
2 22 U. S. C. A. § 252 declares: "Whenever any writ or process is sued out or
prosecuted by any person in any court of the United States, or of a State, or by any
judge or justice, whereby the person of any ambassador or public minister of any
foreign prince or State, authorized and received as such by the President, or
any domestic or domestic servant of any such minister, is arrested or imprisoned,
or his goods or chattels are distrained, seized, or attached, such writ or process
shall be deemed void."
3 Cases of that character may be found in Re Republic of Bolivia Exploration
Syndicate, Ltd., [1914] 1 Ch. 139; Musurus Bey v. Gadban. 2 Q. B. 352 (1894);
Magdalena Steam Navigation Co. v. Martin, 28 L. J. Q. B. 310 (1859) ; In re Dillon,
Fed. Cas. No. 3914 (1854) ; Ex parte Cabrera, Fed. Cas. No. 2278 (1805) ; State v.
De La Foret, 2 Nott. & McCord (S. C.) 217 (1820). See also 1 Op. U. S. Atty. Gen.
71 (1797) and 5 Op. U. S. Atty. Gen. 69 (1849).
4 6 N. Y. S. 619 (1839).
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territories on official business are not to be denied all the rights annexed
to that position, the recognition of which all nations owe to each other 5
About one year later, in Beyley v. Piedanna et Mauroy,6 a French
court reached a similar result in a case involving an American consul
en route to his post at Genoa who was served with civil process but was
released by the court because of a statute similar to the federal one.
The French statute, however, purported to make no distinction as to the
rank of the foreign officer involved whereas the present American one
applies only to ambassadors or public ministers. For that reason, immunity has been denied here to lesser officials accredited to or assigned
to serve in the United States such as consuls,7 "honorary" consulate
officers, 8 chancellors of consulates,9 charges des affaires, 10 and to the
families of any of these lesser diplomatic officers."
They must look for
protection of their personal and property rights to the law of the states
in which they are temporarily resident." Attaches to foreign embassies,
however, are immune 1 3 as are their families and the families of ambassadors and ministers, 1 4 including the members of their official domestic
suites."
The second American case on the point is that of Wilson v. Blanco,16
decided in 1889. The defendant there, a duly accredited envoy extraordin5 The court said, in part, that: "It is clear that this principle is founded not on
any municipal law of this country but on the law of nations . . . I do not suppose
that it [a federal statute similar to 22 U. S. C. A. § 252] was intended to abrogate
any part of the generally received and acknowledged principles of international law
on that subject." See 6 N. Y. S. 619 at 627.
6 Trib. Civ. Seine Sirey 41, 2.148, cited in Bergman v. De Sieyes, 71 F. Supp. 334
at 339.
7Auer v. Costa, 23 F. Supp. 22 (1938)
U. S. v. Tarcuanu, 10 F. Supp. 445 (1935);
Gittings v. Crawford, Fed. Cas. No. 5,465 (1838); U. S. v. Ravara, Fed. Cas. No.
16,222 (1793). See also 1 Op. U. S. Atty. Gen. 77 (1797) ; 1 Op. U. S. Atty. Gen.
406 (1820) ; and 2 Op. U. S. Atty. Gen. 725 (1835).
s In Jay-Thorpe, Inc. v. Brown, 43 N. Y. S. (2d) 728 (1943). the defendant had
been subpoenaed to appear as a witness. He moved to vacate the subpoena on the
ground that he was the honorary Consulate-General of the Republic of Greece to
New Orleans, although he was not a Greek national. His motion was denied.
9:Mforacchini v. Moracchini, 126 Misc. 443. 213 N. Y. S. 168 (1925); Tailored
Woman, Inc. v. Bibily, 126 Misc. 354, 212 N. Y. S. 704 (1925).
10 DuPont v. Pichon, 4 Dall. 321, 1 L. Ed. 851 (1805) ; Hollander v. Paiz, 41 F.
732 (1890).
11 Herman v. Apetz, 130 Misc. 618, 221 N. Y. S. 389 (1927).
12 19 Op. U. S. Atty. Gen. 16 (1887).
13 In re Anfrye, 3 Weekly Notes Cas. 188 (1876) ; U. S. v. Benner, Fed. Cas. No.
14,568 (1830) : Girardon v. Angelone, 234 App. Div. 351, 254 N. Y. S. 657 (1932).
But see contra: Carbone v. Carbone. 123 Misc. 656, 206 N. Y. S. 40 (1924).
'4 Herman v. Apetz, 130 Misc. 618, 224 N. Y. S. 389 (1927).
'5 Respublica v. De Longchamps. 1 Dall. 111. 1 L. Ed. 59 (1784) ; U. S. v. La
Fontaine, Fed. Cas. No. 15,550 (1831).
a6 4 N. Y. S. 714 (1889).
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ary and minister plenipotentiary of Venezuela to France, was served
with a civil process while in New York en route to France. His motion
to vacate the service of summons upon him and also to vacate a judgment
rendered on default was granted, the court citing the earlier American
decision and stating that such a ruling was necessary to the free and
unimpeded exercise of the defendant's diplomatic duties.
In only one case has a contrary ruling been reached and that was in
1
the New York case of Carbone v. Carbone." In that case, the defendant
was a diplomatic attach6 of the Republic of Panama assigned to its legation
in Italy and he was served with a summons in an action for absolute
divorce. An order for his arrest on a writ of ve exeat was also issued. He
gave bond to secure his release and then moved to vacate the order of
arrest, to set aside the service, and to discharge the bond because of his
diplomatic status. The court granted the motion to vacate the order of
arrest and to discharge the bond but it denied the motion to set aside the
service of summons. It considered that the case was governed by the
provisions of the federal statute above referred to and that such statute
did not warrant granting immunity as it applied only to diplomats accredited to the United States, which was not the situation of the defendant. The court likewise refused to recognize the broad principle of international law laid down by Twiss to the effect that "it is in the common
interests of nations that the peace of the world should be maintained, and
the personal inviolability of the Ambassador, whose mission is essentially
that of peace, is as necessary for that end where he is passing through on
his way to his destination as when he has reached his post.'"" It also
purported to find a distinction between the case before it and the earlier
ones on the ground that the latter involved arrests while in the case
at hand the question had been narrowed to one of service of civil summons. It granted the defendant his freedom because it was believed there
was a duty, under the law of nations, not to prevent him from discharging his diplomatic functions by restraining his personal liberty. The
fact that the defendant was only an attach6 and not an ambassador or
public minister was immaterial in view of the ruling that members of the
staff of a diplomat are to be accorded the same privileges and immunities'
that are granted to the diplomat himself.' 9 The case seems weak, how17
123 Misc. 656, 206 N. Y. S. 40 (1924).
18

Twiss,

The Law of Nations (Longmans,

Green & Co., London, 1884), 2d Ed.,

Vol. 1, § 222. Others expressing the same Idea are Grotius, De Jure et Belli Pacis
(John W. Parker, London. 1853), Lib. 2, Ch. 8, § 9: Oppenheim, International Law
(Longmans. Green & Co., London. 1920), 3d Ed., Vol. 1, § 398; Hall, International
Law (LaSalle Extension University, Chicago, 1924). 8th Ed.. p. 364; and Wheaton,
Elements of International Law (Stevens & Sons, London, 1929), 6th Ed., p. 469.
19 See cases cited in note 13, ante.
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ever, for it fails to take into account the fact that the diplomat might be
just as much restrained from the performance of his duties by the necessity
of appearing and contesting a civil suit, attending the trial, testifying
and the like, as if he were locked up in the local prison. It is, however,
expressive of a minority view on the subject if there can be said to be
either a majority or a minority view from so slender a stock of precedents.
Various theories designed to support the holding in the instant case
have been expounded and debated over by the more eminent writers on international law. Although now outmoded and, logically, no longer applicable, it was once urged that an ambassador ought to be given extensive
immunities and privileges because he travelled in an atmosphere of extraterritoriality so that, wherever he went, he theoretically remained in the
territory of his sovereign. That explanation, based largely on a fiction,
has almost completely disappeared as an explanation. 2° Another theory
which has received some consideration has been designated as the "concession theory." It explains the juridical basis of diplomatic privileges
and immunities by presuming that a state in receiving a diplomatic
2
agent tacitly agrees that he shall be exempt from its jurisdiction. '
Although this theory has been adopted, extended and modified by statutes
in most countries it does not furnish a satisfactory explanation as to why
diplomats must be accorded privileges. The most logically sound, and
therefore the most widely accepted theory, adopts the principle of ne imnpediatur legatio whereby the free and unhindered fulfillment of the purpose of the ambassador's mission is of utmost importance not only to the
nations immediately concerned but also to the entire family of nations
in their endeavor to maintain peaceful relations with one another. It
is readily discernible that this theory, sometimes referred to as the
theory of "interest of function," provides equal justification for extending diplomatic privileges and immunities to ambassadors en route
to their duties as it does for those accredited to the nation where the attempted restraint by civil process is practiced.
This last-mentioned theory, borne out by the decision in the instant
case, is likely to possess increasing importance by reason of the significant
advances made in aerial navigation so that now no spot on the globe is
more than sixty hours distant by air. Important aerial centers in the
United States will be internationally important as they are made into
regular ports of call for airliners carrying diplomatic as well as other
personages to their destinations in other parts of the world. It would
20 Preuss, "Theoretical Basis of Diplomatic Immunities." 10 N. Y. U. L. Q. 170
(1932).
21 Vattel. The Law of Nations (T. & J. W. JohnPon & Co.. Philadelphia. 1869),
Ingraham's revision of Chitty's trans., pp. 466-7.
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tend to create a serious breach of relations with other countries if their
diplomatic personnel were subject to process even in civil actions while
changing from one airliner to another. To expect them to answer on
such service while they have more significant reasons for reaching their
distant posts as soon as possible is obviously unwarranted.
With the advent of a United Nations, Congress has at least recognized the need for expanding the federal statutes in order to meet problems that will arise as to the immunities and privileges to be accorded to
the personnel of the members of the United Nations. Its charter only
loosely provides for those privileges and immunities that are necessary for
the exercise of the functions of the organization.2 2 Congress has added
to the subject by passing the Immunities Act of 1945 which gives foreign
representatives to international organizations of which the United States
is a member a limited immunity from the service of civil process.2 3 That
statute does not reach the point here involved, but the courts should
recognize, in the congressional treatment of the problem as it relates to
the newer international organizations, a spirit equally applicable to older
institutions. The court concerned with the instant case at least did so
and thereby achieved a sound result.
J. C. GREGORY

BILLS AND NOTES - RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES ON INDORSEMENT OR
TRANSFER-WHETHER OR NOT TRANSFERREE OF NEGOTIABLE INSTALLMENT
NOTE .AFTER DEFAULT ON FIRST INSTALLMENT IS A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE
AS TO BALANCE OF PRINCIPAL DUE THEREON-The recent decision by the

Supreme Court of California in the case of Bliss v. California Coopera1
tive Producers
should attract the concern of all who are interested in
22 United Nations Charter, Art. 105, states: "(1)
The Organization shall enjoy in
the territory of each of its members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes; (2) Representatives of the members of the
United Nations and officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Organization."
23 22 U. S. C. A. § 288D recites that: "Representatives of foreign governments in
or to international organizations and officers and employees of such organizations
shall be immune from suit and legal process relative to acts performed by them in
their official capacity and falling within their functions as such representatives,
officers, or employees except insofar as such immunity may be waived by the foreign
government or international organization concerned." Executive Order No. 9698, of
Feb. 19, 1946, 22 U. S. C. A. § 288, names not only the United Nations but also the
Pan-American Union. the International Labor Organization, and the Food and
Agriculture Organization as international bodies entitled to enjoy the privileges and
immunities set forth in the statute referred to.
1- Cal. -, 172 P. (2d) 62 (1946). Traynor, J.. wrote a dissenting opinion concurred in by Eldmonds. J., and Spence, J. See also Cal. -, 181 P. (2d) 369
(1947).
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commercial transactions involving the use of installment notes. In that
case, three installment notes payable in equal amounts over a ten-year
period were given by the defendant to a newly formed cooperative society.
The first installment matured on January 2, 1928, but was never paid.
At that 'time the cooperative society had on hand sufficient property belonging to the defendant to cover the first installment yet it waited until
August 31, 1928, before crediting the maker with the first installment on
its books. In the meantime, the notes had been pledged to the plaintiff
and, when the cooperative society went into bankruptcy, plaintiff took title
to the security and thereafter sued the maker. To the defense of failure
of consideration offered by the defendant, plaintiff asserted that he was
a holder in due course and, as such, was a person against whom such a
personal defense was of no avail. The lower court found that the plaintiff was not a bona fide purchaser as to the installment which was past due
on the face of the notes at the time of the pledge but was a holder in
due course as to the balance of the notes. Upon appeal, such decision
was reversed, the California Supreme Court reasoning that, as one installment was in default on the date of the transfer, the plaintiff took
the rest as an "overdue" instrument .2 It was also of the opinion that it
made no difference whether the past due installment was or was not
eventually paid.
The only question involved being whether or not the plaintiff was a
holder in due course, the absence or presence of the necessary elements
requisite to determine this question are of chief concern but the problem
may be examined in the light of analogous situations. The problem may
be present in any one of three types of cases, to-wit: (1) where there is
a transfer of a note payable in installments and one or more of these
installments are overdue at the time of negotiation; (2) where a series of
notes based upon the same consideration but of different maturity dates
are transferred subsequently to the non-payment of one of the notes; and
(3) where a note with interest installments is negotiated after a default
in the payment of one of the interest installments. While the legal effect
of these different factual situations is for the greater part identical some
slight differences do exist and will be noted hereafter.
To constitute plaintiff as a holder in due course, the first element
of concern requires that the taking be before maturity. The majority
of the court in the instant case expressly stated that default in the payment of the first installment due upon the notes constituted the remainder
"overdue."
On the face of things, this statement is erroneous for only
one installment had become due, in the absence of acceleration, and it
2 Deering Cal. Civ. Code 1937, § 3133(2). That section is identical with Section
52(2) of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act.
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could not logically be contended that the remainder had matured contrary to the very terms of the notes. It is true that there are decisions
in which courts have unfortunately used the words "matured" and "overdue" when attacking similar problems,3 but in each of these decisions the
main question was one of good faith or notice of dishonor and the terms
were used loosely. In the instant case, on the other hand, the fact of
maturity was the only ground upon which the court could have reached
its decision.
An installment note, or series of notes, may mature in entirety upon
default in one installment or in the payment of one note only in the event
that the note or notes contain an acceleration clause. Even then, a distinction must be made between a clause which is optional in character and
has not been exercised prior to negotiation and one which matures the
note or notes automatically. In the case of the former, it is apparent
that until the option is exercised the note has not matured,4 although
instances may exist where the prior holder has taken advantage of the
option before transferring the notes.' On the other hand, where, upon
default, the balance of the note or notes becomes due automatically, the
transferree subsequent to default could never be regarded as a holder
before maturity,6 unless in the rare instantce where, because a note cannot
mature before delivery, the purchaser takes after the note has matured
because of some automatic acceleration clause while it still remained in the
maker's possession.7 There was no acceleration clause in the notes involved in the instant case, so it is ridiculous to argue that the plaintiff was
not a holder in due course because the remainder was overdue by virtue of
the default in one installment.
The dissenting opinion therein strikes at the heart of the real issue,
not one regarding maturity but rather whether or not the default in
payment of the first installment constitutes a dishonor or, conversely,
whether a taking under such circumstances shows a lack of good faith.
Courts seem to be in almost complete agreement that a failure to pay a
3 Huselby v. Allison, 25 S. W. (2d) 1108 (Tex. Civ. App., 1930) ; National State
Bank v. Richetts, 152 S. W. 646 (Tex. Civ. App., 1912) ; Norwood v. Leeves, 115
S. W. 53 (Tex. Civ. App., 1909) ; Lybrand v. Fuller, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 116, 69 S. W.
10Q5 (1902).
4 Gillette v. Hodge, 170 F. 313 (1909) ; Lowenstein v. Phelan. -17 Neb. 429. 22
N. W. 561 (1885) ; Hobart M. Cable Co. v. Bruce, 135 Okla. 170, 274 P. 665 (1929)
Holt v. Guaranty & Loan Co., 136 Ore. 272, 296 P. 852 (1931).
5 See, for example, Christian Community of Universal Brotherhood v. Graf, 137
Ore. 638, 1 P. (2d) 596 (1931).
6 Stoy v. Bledsoe. 31 Ind. App. 643, 68 N. E. 907 (1903): Yeomans v. Nachman,
198 Mo. App. 195, 198 S. W. 180 (1917) : Rowe v. Scott. 28 S. D. 145, 132 N. W. 695
(1911) ; Marion Nat. Bank v. Harden. 83 W. Va. 119. 97 S. E. 600 (1918).
7 Beach v. Bennett, 16 Colo. App. 459, 66 P. 567 (1901).
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principal installment on a note is notice of dishonor.'
These decisions
are based on the fact that default in the payment of even an installment
of principal raises a presumption that there is a valid reason for such
failure or refusal to pay, thereby putting the transferree upon notice
that a defense might exist. The majority hold that where the series of notes
is based upon the same consideration, and one of them is in default at
the time when the transfer takes place, the transferree is not to be regarded as a holder in due course but takes subject to all existing defenses,9
although there is a slender minority to the contrary. 10
In the case of overdue interest installments, one line of cases, regarding the promise to pay interest as an integral part of the contract of
equal importance as the promise to repay the principal, treats a default
thereon as notice of dishonor just as if it had been a default on an installment of principal." Other jurisdictions regard interest as a mere incident
to the debt, so that default is not evidence of dishonor and notice of such
fact does not show a lack of good faith in the purchase of such an instrument. 12 In between these views are other cases which treat the fact of
default in interest as having some, but not necessarily conclusive evidentiary value, in determining whether or not the necessary element of good
faith is present.13 This view would seem to be the more logical one for
8 Hall v. E. W. Wells & Sons, 24 Cal. App. 238, 141 P. 53 (1941); Archibald
Hardware Co. v. Gifford, 44 Ga. App. 837, 163 S. E. 254 (1932); General Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. Talbott, 39 Ida. 707, 230 P. 30 (1924) ; Vinton v. King, 86 Mass.
(4 Allen) 562 (1862) ; Sorenson v. Greysolon, 170 Minn. 259, 212 N. W. 457 (1927) ;
National State Bank v. Richetts, 152 S. W. 646 (Tex. Civ. App., 1912) ; Norwood v.
,Leaves, 115 S. W. 53 (Tex. Civ. App., 1909).
9 Railway Postal Clerks Inv. Ass'n v. Wells, 147 Ga. 377, 94 S. E. 228 (1917)
Beasley Hardware Co. v. Stevens. 42 Ga. App. 114, 155 S. E. 67 (1930) ; Harrington
v. Claflin, 91 Tex. 294, 42 S. W. 1055 (1897) ; Ferguson v. Wiede, 46 S. W. 392
(Tex. Civ. App., 1898); Huselby v. Allison, 25 S. W. (2d) 1108 (Tex. Civ. App..
1930); Iowa City State Bank v. Friar, 167 S. W. 261 (Tex. Civ. App., 1914);
Lybrand v. Fuller. 30 Tex. Civ. App. 1166, 69 S. W. 1005 (1902); Masterson v.
Turnley, 220 S. W. 428 (Tex. Civ. App., 1920).
10 Hobart M. Cable Co. v. Bruce, 135 Okla. 170. 274 P. 665 (1929) ; Morgan v.
Farmington Coal & Coke Co., 97 W. Va. 83, 124 S. E. 591 (1924).
11 Mills v. Charlson. 201 Minn. 167, 275 N. W. 609 (1937) ; First Nat. Bank v.
Forsyth, 67 Minn. 257. 69 N. W. 909 (1897) ; Citizens Savings Bank v. Couse, 68
Misc. 153, 124 N. Y. S. 79 (1910) ; Hart v. Stickney, 41 Wis. 630, 22 Am. Rep. 728
(1877).
12 Winter v. Nobs, 19 Ida. 18, 112 P. 525 (1910)
Cooper v. Hocking Val. Nat.
Bank, 21 Ind. App. 358, 50 N. E. 775 (1898): Higby v. Bahrenfuss, 180 Iowa 316,
163 N. W. 247 (1917) ; Kreitz v. Savings Deposit Bank & Trust Co., 21 Ohio App.
354, 153 N. E. 236 (1926) ; Taylor v. Buckner, 100 Ore. 75, 196 P. 839 (1921);
United States Nat. Bank v. Floss, 38 Ore. 68, 62 P. 751 (1900) ; Merchants Nat.
Bank v. Smith, 110 S. C. 458, 96 S. E. 690 (1918) ; Barbour v. Finke, 41 S. D. 644,
201 N. W. 711 (1924) ; Tuke v. Feagin, 181 S. W. 805 (Tex. Civ. App., 1915).
13 City of New Port Richey v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.. 105 F. (2d) 348 (1939)
Lumpkin v. Lutgens. 143 Minn. 139, 172 N. W. 893 (1919) ; Batson v. Peters, 89
S. W. (2d) 46 (Mo., 1935) ; Fidelity Trust Co. v. Whitehead, 165 N. C. 74, 80 S. E.
1065 (1914) ; McPherrin v. Tittle, 36 Okla. 510, 129 P. 721 (1913) ; Shultz v.
Crewdson, 95 Wash. 266. 163 P. 266 (1918).
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the presence of an overdue interest payment should put the purchaser
on guard but should not be conclusive of bad faith.
It must be remembered, however, that a party must have notice of
dishonor before he can be bound thereby. 1 4 There was no finding in the
instant case that the plaintiff had been told that there had been a prior
default when he took the notes. All he knew was that he obtained the
notes after one of the installments became due. The mere fact that there
was no endorsement of credit or payment on the notes created no presumption that the installment had not been paid, 15 and as he took all but
the first installment before maturity the only effect that the prior default
might have had was to create a notice of dishonor. Absent such notice, the
upper court should have affirmed rather than reversed the holding of the
trial court.
I. D. FASMAN
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first glance, the term "death" would appear to be capable of only one'
definition, but the courts of Illinois have found it necessary to expand
the ordinary connotation of the word when construing Section 2 of the
Injuries Act. An example of another such definition is found in the
recent case of Carroll v. Rogers' where the deceased, a minor and
resident of Illinois, was fatally injured in Missouri by defendant's
negligent act. He died thirteen months later in Illinois and suit was
instituted in this state based on the Missouri wrongful death statute.
The action was dismissed in the trial court on motion predicated on the
ground that the court lacked jurisdiction since the act causing death
occurred outside of Illinois.2
That court, following an interpretation
of the word "death"
which had been laid down in several earlier
decisions, concluded that it was confined to mean the wrongful act which
caused the demise rather that the fact of expiration of life. The Appellate
Court for the Second District, however, reversed that holding, thereby
indicating that the word included its ordinary meaning and was not
14 U. S. v. Capen, 55 F. Supp. 81 (1944) ; Archibald Hardware Co. v. Gifford, 44
Ga. App.837, 163 S. E. 254 (1932); Spencer v. Alki Point Transp. Co., 53 Wash. 77,
101 P. 509 (1909).
15 McCorckle v. Miller, 64 Mo. App. 153 (1895).

1 330 Il. 114, 70 N. E. (2d) 218 (1946).
2 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 70, § 2,provides, among other things, that ...
no action
shall be brought or prosecuted in this state to recover damages for a death occurring
outside of the state ......
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limited in the fashion supposed. As the death did occur in Illinois, the
courts of this state had jurisdiction of the case.
Prior to 1903, there was no limitation upon the jurisdiction of the
Illinois courts with respect to wrongful death actions for, even if the
case arose outside of the state, the remedy was treated as being transitory
in nature and the local courts were free to apply the statutes of other
states so long as they were not contrary to any public policy of Illinois.3
In that year, the legislature added a proviso limiting the jurisdiction of
the courts in such cases by forbidding suit in this state for a "death
occurring outside of this state. "4
In the first few controversies arising under the section as so amended,
it was contended that the change merely served to prevent the court
ifrom applying the Illinois statute when the action accrued outside of
the state but did not serve to bar the court from taking jurisdiction.
That contention was uniformly answered with the statement that, since
a state statute never has extra-territorial application, there would have
been no need for the new provision so any such interpretation would
render it utterly useless.' It was also argued that the amended section
was unconstitutional for it would operate to prevent the Illinois courts
from recognizing and giving full faith and credit to the statutes of the
other states. Here again, the Illinois Supreme Court answered in the
negative, pointing out that the legislature, when determining the public
policy of the state, was fully empowered to limit the jurisdiction of its
courts.'
At this point, the meaning of the term "death" became important.
Did it mean the actual process of dying, or could it denote the wrongful
act causing death? It is quite apparent that where both the act and
the death occurred outside the state there was no necessity for making
any distinctions so the courts had no difficulty.7 The same thing was true
3 C. & E. I. R. R. Co. v. Rouse, 178 Ill. 132. 52 N. E. 951 (1899) : Hannah v.
C. T. Ry. Co, 41 Ill. App. 116 (1891) : Shedd v. Moran, 10 Ill. App. 618 (1882).
4 Laws 1903, p. 217. In Brennan v. Electrical Installation Co., 120 11. App. 461
(1905), however, it was held that the amendment had no effect upon an action
instituted before its enactment even though the same had not yet been decided.
5 Wall v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 290 Ill. 227, 125 N. E. 20 (1919) ; Dougherty
v. American McKenna Co., 255 Ill. 369, 99 N. E. 619 (1912) ; Stephen v. I. C. R: R.
Co., 128 Ill. App. 99 (1906).
6 Dougherty v. American McKenna Co., 255 Ill. 369, 99 N. E. 619 (1912).
The
United States Supreme Court, however, in Kenney v. Loyal Order of Moose, 252
U. S. 411, 40 S. Ct. 71. 64 L. Ed. 638 (1920). reversing 28,5 Ill. 188, 120 N. E. 631
(1918), held that Illinois had to give full faith and credit to an Alabama judgment
based on a claim for wrongful death, despite the fact that the action accrued
outside of Illinois, forbidding the state court from going behind the judgment to
ascertain its basis.
7 See cases cited in note 5, ante.
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where both events happened within the state.
Where, however, one
occurred outside the state and the other within, problems such as the
instant one or the converse thereof would arise.
In Crane v. Chicago & Western Railroad Company, for example, a
negligent act in Illinois resulted in the death of the deceased in Indiana.
The action was instituted in Illinois. It was urged that the court did not
have jurisdiction as the death had occurred outside of the state. The
court, however, emphasized the fact that the underlying basis for every
wrongful death action is the wrongful act itself rather than the fact
of death, thereby holding that the term "death" as used in the amended
statute could be read as if it was stated that no action should be brought
in this state where "the wrongful act causing the death" occurred
outside of the state.9 If the act occurred in Illinois, the place of the
resultant death was unimportant.
Just the opposite situation was presented in Fitzgerald v. Cleveland,
Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company,10 for there the
wrongful act took place in Indiana and the death followed in Illinois.
Again the Illinois court took jurisdiction, despite the claim that the
Crane case prevented the maintenance of the suit, on the obviously
correct conclusion that the Crane case had merely defined the term
"death" as being broad enough to include the wrongful act but that
the court there had had no occasion to determine that the term did not
also embrace its ordinary connotation. As the decedent in fact died in
Illinois, it could not be said that the "death" occurred outside of the
state. The instant case has exactly the same standing, so it may be
said that until a court declines to take jurisdiction where either the act
or death, taken alone, occurs in Illinois it must be recognized that the
word "death" as used in the statute has a double meaning.
The court in the instant case used language tending to minimize
the effect of the Crane case, indicating that the interpretation promulgated
there was a strained one, not likely to be reached again, due to the fact
that Indiana would not allow a recovery and the court was anxious
to see that justice was done. There is nothing in that decision which
would justify any such conclusion and it is reasonable to suppose that,
as the plaintiff was a resident of Illinois, he had never attempted to
bring suit in the other state. The decision in the Crane case should not
8 233-Ill. 259, 89 N. E. 222 (1908).
9 The decision became something of a leading case, being cited and followed in
Campe v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 148 Ill. App. 224 (1909), and Fortner v. Wabash
R. Co., 162 Ili. App. 1 (1911).
10 151 Ill. App. 32 (1909). See also the more recent case of Rost v. Noble & Co.,
316 Il. 357, 147 N. E. 258 (1925).
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be passed over lightly for its basis is founded in logic and good public
policy. The accident occurred in Illinois. The court was sitting in the
state whose law would govern the plaintiff's right, even. had the controversy been taken into another jurisdiction. 1' It would have been
absurd for the court to deny redress to a party, especially a resident,
by refusing to apply its own laws which it could be considered far more
capable of administering than any other court. As the apparent purpose
of the prohibition was to prevent the courts of this state from being
cluttered with litigation lacking any connection whatsoever with Illinois,
not even that purpose would have been served by a contrary holding.
Since it is the situs of the injury which determines the existence of the
cause of action, it is no more than, reasonable to contend that there is
a stronger link where the injury occurs within the state than where the
death does. It may be unfortunate that the statutory language was not
broad enough, without interpretation, to cover both situations but the
holding of the Crane case should not be lightly cast aside.
Legislative revision of the statute in question, occurring in 1935, did
not change the phraseology interpreted in the cases mentioned but purported to put certain limitations on the operation of that proviso. While
actions to recover damages for deaths occurring outside of the state are
till generally prohibited, they may be maintained "where a right of
action for such death exists under the laws of the place where such
death occurred and service of process in, such suit" cannot be had upon
the defendant in such place.' 2 The present case, decided after these
additions were made, properly draws no support therefrom for the
death clearly took place in Illinois. It may, however, be of value to
determine the effect of this amendment on the jurisdictional question.
In its present form, the statute limits the operation of the prohibition
against suit here to cases where (1) the place of death does not provide
the plaintiff with a right of action, and (2) the defendant is not
amenable to service of process in that jurisdiction. Read literally, if
either (1) or (2) is lacking, the Illinois courts are to take jurisdiction,
even though the death occurred outside of this state, if the parties can
be found here. Given such literal interpretation, an Illinois court might
be persuaded to take jurisdiction, especially on behalf of one of its
citizens, even though this state had no factual connection whatsoever
with the controversy, if the courts of the place of death, whether
measured by the infliction of harm or fatal result, were not open to
entertain such an action. Whether or not this section will be given so
broad an interpretation with respect to the first element remains for
11 For list of authorities, see 25 C. J. S., Death, § 28.
12 Laws 1935, p. 916; Il1.
Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 70. § 2.
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the future to determine. Lacking a common law remedy and absent
any statute creating one, it would seem that principles of the conflict
of laws concerning the lex loci delicti would dictate that no remedy
should be provided.13
It is more likely that the amendment was prompted by and was
intended to cure certain defects noted by a federal court sitting in this
jurisdiction.1
That court pointed out that if both the act and the death
occurred outside of Illinois but were the product of the fault of an
Illinois resident, all the. latter would have to do would be to remain
within the state, and he would be safe from litigation therein in the
state courts. 5 Any policy granting such an asylum to a resident ought
to be severely condemned. Now, under the new provision, and particularly
by reason of the second element, if the defendant cannot be served in
the place where death occurs, then, presumably a suit may be maintained
in Illinois. This state might not have any real connection with the suit
but so long as the defendant was not amenable to service of process at
the situs of the death our courts could take jurisdiction. There is no
decision on that point at present but in the light of the evident public
policy, no other result could be expected.
W. A. HEINDL

13 In general, see Goodrich. Handbook of the Conflict of Laws (West Pub. Co.,
St. Paul, Minn., 1938), 2d Ed.. pp. 250-6. As to workmen's compensation, compare
Friedman Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Commission. 284 Ill. 554, 120 N. E. 460 (1918),
with Biddy v. Blue Bird Air Service, 374 Ill. 506, 30 N. R. (2d) 14 (1940).
14 See Swett v. Givner, 5 F. Supp. 739 (1934). The federal courts sitting in Illinois have always treated this provision as procedural in nature and have, therefore,
repeatedly refused to be bound by it: Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Larussi. 161 F. 66
(1908) ; Martineau v. Eastern Air Lines. 64 F. Supp. 235 (1946).
15 This is under the supposition that the defendant removed himself from the state
where the action accrued before he was served with process and was not amenable
under a statute such as Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 95,. § 23, providing for substituted
service where the defendant is a non-resident and the cause of action against him
arose out of his use of the highways of the state. Even then, the problem would be
a real one if the local statute, as applied to a principal sought to be held for the
acts of his agent, were given the interpretation placed on the Illinois statute in
Jones v. Pebler, 296 Ill. App. 460. 16 N. E. (2d) 438 (1938). noted in 17 CHICAGOKENT LAW REvIEw 69. reversed in 371 Ill. 309. 20 N. E. (2d) 592 (1939). Another
angle is revealed by the decision in Smalley v. Hutcheson, 296 N. Y. 68. 70 N. E.
(2d) 161 (1946).
The plaintiffs there were injured as a result of a collision in
Illinois between their automobile and the car driven by the defendant's intestate,
who was killed in the accident. The deceased was a resident of New York and
administration of the estate occurred there. Suit in apt time was instituted in
Illinois. service being had under the statute aforesaid. That suit was dismissed on
defendant's special appearance. the Illinois court holding that the statute did not
authorize substituted service upon the personal representative of the non-resident
driver. A subsequent suit brought in New York was held barred by the statute o±
limitations and the pendency of the Illinois action was regarded as insufficient to
prevent the running of the statute.
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SUCH CONDUCT IS NOT JUSTIFIED BECAUSE OF ABSENCE OF LABOR DISPUTE

OR GRIEVANCF--The case of Dinoffria v. International Brotherhood of

Teamsters and Chauffeurs Local Union No. 1791 presents a problem in
labor law which, while not novel in Illinois, is of interest because the
result reached appears to be contradictory to that attained in two other
The plaintiffs,
Appellate Court decisions to be found in this state.'
self-employed operators of retail gasoline service stations, instituted an
action against the defendant labor union requesting relief in the form

of an injunction and money damages. The union was in the process
of picketing and boycotting the plaintiffs' businesses because of plaintiffs'
refusal to join the union. Such conduct resulted in substantial injuries
to the plaintiffs as they were not able to obtain the necessary supplies

for the carrying on of their trade. The trial court refused both injunctive
relief and the claim for damages, but, on appeal, the Appellate Court
reversed and remanded. It agreed with the operators' contention that
since they employed no one but themselves they were in no way
jeopardizing the union or its members and, therefore, interference by it
was wholly unjustified.
The approach utilized by the court in solving the instant problem
is a simple one. It merely found that the union had no legitimate
The basis of this
objective in seeking the plaintiffs' membership.
conclusion rests upon two grounds: (1) there were no employees whose
working conditions and the like could be improved, and (2) there were
no allegations that the plaintiffs were employing methods injurious to
the union or its .members. The defendant rested its case upon the
constitutional guaranty of free speech.

The court, in passing over this

argument, said: "Such conduct cannot be deemed lawful and protected
by the constitutional guaranty of free speech."2 This language is vastly
different from that used in the two previously mentioned Illinois decisions
where the court, in both cases, stressed the right of free speech as
permitting the union to picket the self-employer.
This conflict in the application of legal principles and reasoning
seems to run throughout the cases. Condemnation of the conduct of a
union in picketing a one-man business has been justified on the ground
1331

Il. App. 129, 72 N. E. '(2d) 635 (1947).

Writ of error has been granted.

2Baker v. Retail Clerks' I. Protective Ass'n, 313 Ill. App. 432. 40 N. E. (2d) 571
(1942) ; Naprawa v. Chicago Flat Janitors' Union Local No. 1. 315 Ill. App. 328,
43 N. E. (2d) 198 (1942), leave to appeal denied 382 Ill. 124, 46 N. E. (2d) 27
(1943).
3 331 Ill. App. 129 at 137, 72 N. E. (2d) 635 at 638.
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that it is unlawful,4 an invasion of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment, 5 or that no labor dispute, as defined by anti-injLuction
statutes, can exist between the union and this type of business.,
The
opposite view has been upheld on the contention that there can be a
labor dispute between a one-man business and a union,7 or that freedom
of speech guarantees the right to picket,8 and, therefore, makes it
unnecessary to determine whether or not there is a dispute present.'
One court, in commenting upon this, has stated: "The more recent
cases justify conduct, such as that charged against the defendant, on
the broader grounds of their constitutional guaranty of the right to free
speech. '
It is apparent by now that if the stated reasoning of the courts is
accepted at face value it throws the whole picture into utter confusion.
The difficulty results from the fact that the courts have recognized the
existence of two separate rights as guaranteed by the Constitution which
are in opposition to one another in any labor conflict. The union has
a right to picket under the constitutional guarantee of free speech, and
a businessman has the right to engage in his business without interference
4 Lyle v. Local No. 452 Amalgamated Meat Cutters, etc., 174 Tenn. 222, 124 S. W.
(2d) 701 (1939).
5 Roraback v. Motion Picture Machine Operators' Union, 140 Minn. 481, 168 N. W.
766 (1918), rehearing denied 141 Minn. 140, 169 N. W. 529 (1918). See also the
concurring opinion of North, J., in Harper v. Brennan, 311 Mich. 489 at 501.
18 N. W. (2d) 905 at 909.
6 Luft v. Flove, 270 N. Y. 640. 1 N. E. (2d) 369 (1936). affirming 246 App. Div.
523, 283 N. Y. S. 441 (1935) : Feinberg v. Pappas, 30 N. Y. S. (2d) 5 (1.941) ; Fertel
v. Rosenzweig, 28 N. Y. S. (2d) 6 (1941) ; Comen v. Osman, 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 353
(1941) ; Rubin v. Choina, 26 N. Y. S. (2d) 10 (1941); Anastasiou v. Supran, 21
N. Y. S. (2d) 541 (1940) ; Lyons v. Meyerson, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 363 (1940), affirmed
in 260 App. Div. 911, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 557 (1940); Kershnar v. Heller, 14 N. Y. S.
(2d) 595 (1939), modified in 258 App. Div. 751, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 451 (1939) ; Gips
v. Osman, 170 Misc. 53, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 828 (1939) ; Botnick v. Winokur, 7 N. Y. S.
(2d) 6 (1938). The foregoing New York cases take it for granted without discussion that unless there is a labor dispute within the terms of the Anti-injunction Act,
there can be no union interference. Those opinions which do go into the question
reach the same conclusion: Zueidon v. Goldberg, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 272 (1940);
Leach v. Himmelfarb, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 642 (1940) ; Pitter v. Kaminsky, 7 N. Y. S.
(2d) 10 (1938). But see contra: Bierber v. Bininbaum, 168 Misc. 943, 6 N. Y. S.
(2d) 63 (1938).
7-Reiner v. Sullivan. 33 N. Y. S.
(2d) 77 (1942) : Schwartz v. Fish Workers'
Union etc., 170 Misc. 566. 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 2&3 (1939) : Abeles v. Friedman, 171
Misc. 1042, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 252 (1939) : Rohde v. Dighton, 27 F. Supp. 149 (1939).
s Glover v. Retail Clerk's Union, 10 Alaska 274 (1942) ; Naprawa v. Chicago Flat
Janitors' Union Local No. 1. 315 Ill. App. 328, 43 N. E. (2d) 198 (1942), leave to
appeal denied 382 Ill. 124, 46 N. E. (2d) 27 (1,943) : Baker v. Retail Clerks' I.
Protective Ass'n, 313 Ill. App. 432, 40 N. E. (2d) 571 (1942).
9 Bakery & Pastry Drivers. etc. v. Wohl. 315 U. S. 769. 62 S. Ct. 816. S6 L. Ed.
1178 (1942); Cafeteria Employees Union v. Anjelos, 320 U. S. 293, 64 S. Ct. 95,
88 L. Ed. 58 (1943).
10 Glover v. Retail Clerk's Union, 10 Alaska 274 at 284.
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under the Fourteenth Amendment. The dilemma the courts find themselves in can only be resolved by balancing these two rights, one against
the other, although it is seldom that a court takes the time to mention
this."
From a careful analysis of the decisions, it may be gathered that
the test used to determine whether picketing should be allowed is whether
or not in the opinion of the court the union is attempting to attain
a legitimate labor objective. Will the conduct of the union help improve
the economic and working conditions of labor, or will it cause the
business man to desist from some practice which is detrimental to the
laboring man? If so, the picketing will be allowed. Of course, if there
is no apparent legitimate objective and the union is merely trying to
obtain more power or to increase its income, then such interference
should not and will not be tolerated. Naturally, the courts do not
expressly state these considerations. Thus, in Bakery & Pastry Drivers
and Helpers Local 802 v. Wohl, 12 a United States Supreme Court decision
which has been cited many times to the effect that a union has a right
to picket under the guaranty of free speech, the court said: ".

.

. one

need not be in a 'labor dispute' as defined by state law to have a right
under the 14th Amendment to express a grievance in a labor matter
by publication unattended by violence, coercion, or conduct otherwise
unlawful or oppressive.',' 3 The court stated that a labor dispute need
not be involved but it did use the word "grievance" and, when deciding
the case, it went into great detail in pointing out the harmful effect of
the plaintiff's conduct upon the union and its members. It was necessary
to determine that the union was seeking a lawful objective by its picketing
before it was possible to consider the other issues. This same thread
of reasoning can be found in some of the New York decisions, for
while it has repeatedly and dogmatically been held in that state that a
one-man business can never be involved in a labor dispute as there are
no "employees,' 1 4 still where the court has expressly found that the
union had legitimate cause to protest it has been willing to decide against
11 See the concurring opinion of North, J., In Harper v. Brennan, 311 Mich. 489
at 501, 18 N. W. (2d) 905 at 909.
12315 U. S. 769, 662 S. Ct. 816, 86 L. Ed. 1178 (1942).
13 315 U. S. 769 at 774, 62 St. Ct. 816, 86 L. Ed. 1178 at 1183.
14 Luft v. Flove, 270 N. Y. 640, 1 N. E. (2d) 369 (1936). affirming 283 N. Y. S.
441, 246 App. Div. 523 (1935); Feinberg v. Pappas, 30 N. Y. S. (2d)

5 (1941);

Fertel v. Rosenzweig. 28 N. Y. S. (2d) 6 (1941) ; Comen v. Osman, 27 N. Y. S. (2d)

353 (1940) : Rubin v. Choina, 26 N. Y. S. (2d) 10 (1941) ; Lyons v. Meyerson, 18

N. Y. S. (2d) 363 (1940), affirmed in 260 App. Div. 911, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 557 (1940) ;
Kershnar v. Heller, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 595 (1939). modified in 258 App. Div. 751,
15 N. Y. S. (2d) 451 (1939); Gips v. Osman, 170 Misc. 53. 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 828

(1939) ; Botnick v. Winokur, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 6 (1938).
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the majority view. 15 This type of solution for the problem can be found
in other opinions, if they are carefully analyzed; but unfortunately
sufficient facts to permit such close analysis are not always given. 6
It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that in spite of the apparent
conflict in legal reasoning, the only difference that exists among the
courts lies in their determination of what constitutes a legitimate labor
objective. It is impossible to draft a strict definition thereof as this
concept has changed and, no doubt, will change again with the social and
economic outlook.
The query then is what legitimate labor objectives can be attained
by the picketing of a one-man business? As was aptly pointed out in
the instant case, the union cannot justify its conduct on the usual basis
of trying to improve the working conditions of labor employed by the
party picketing. 1' Is it not possible, however, that a union, by picketing
this type of businessman, can improve the working conditions of those
employed by someone else?
In that respect, interference has been
condoned where the one-man business handled non-union goods manufactured by a producer whose workmen the union was trying to organize
for the court reasoned that the only way to bring the union's grievance
before the public and to obtain action was to picket the ultimate
distributor."'
Not only have courts upheld the union's right to picket for the
improvement of labor conditions but they have also refused to enjoin
where the union is attempting to protect gains already made. Thus,
picketing has been allowed where the union objected to the number of
hours a self-employed party kept his place of business open.' 9 It was argued
by the union that such conduct jeopardized the position of the union
worker as the tendency wmqs for these individuals to draw off the business
from the union shops. The court agreed and recognized the fact that a
15 See, for example, Reiner v. Sullivan, 33 N. Y. S. (2d) 77 (1942) ; Abeles v.
Friedman, 171 Misc. 1042, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 252 (1939).
16 The objective in some cases is readily discernible: Glover v. Retail Clerk's
Union. 10 Alaska 274 (1942) ; Baker v. Retail Clerks' I. Protective Ass'n, 313 Ill.
App. 432, 40 N. E. (2d) 571 (1942) ; Evans v. Retail Clerks' Union, 66 Ohio App.
158, 32 N. E. (2d) 51 (1940). In others, the facts are not adequate enough to make
any determination as to whether or not the basis of the court's decision was a
finding of a legitimate labor objective: Ex parte Lyons, 27 Cal. App. (2d) 293,
81 P. (2d) 190 (1938) ; O'Nell v. Building Service Employees I. Union No. 6, 9 Wash.
(2d) 507, 115 P. (2d) 662 (1941).

See also Yablonowitz v. Korn, 205 App. Div. 440, 199 N. Y. S. 769 (1923).
(2d) 910 (1937). See also
Jacobs v. Eison, 188 Misc. 577, 68 N. Y. S. (2d) 921 (1947).
19 Glover v. Retail Clerk's Union, 10 Alaska 274 (1942) ; Baker v. Retail Clerks'
I. Protective Ass'n, 313 Ill. App. 432, 40 N. E. (2d) 571 (1942) : Evans v. Retail
Clerks' Union, 66 Ohio App. 158, 32 N. E. (2d) 51 (1940).
17

18 Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E.
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union might have a vital interest in the number of hours and days a one-

man shop remained open. It is of interest to note, however, that in all of
these cases the union merely wanted the individual proprietor to conform
to union hours but did not insist that he join the union.
Along the same line, other aspects of one-man businesses have been
held inimical to unions and their members so as to justify picketing.
For instance, in two cases,2 independent jobbers were engaged in
purchasing from wholesalers and selling to retailers. They refused to
join the union or to conform to union rules and regulations. As these
individuals did not have to contend with such obligations as social
security taxes or unemployment insurance payments, could work as
many hours as they wished and did not have to draw the union scale
wage, they could operate on a small margin of profit. It was, therefore,
advantageous to the wholesalers to sell to these jobbers instead of
maintaining their own delivery system. A trend was started whereby
regularly employed union drivers would be replaced or forced to become
independent jobbers, resulting in keen competition and disastrous effects
upon working conditions which had originally been fought by the union.
Picketing was, therefore, regarded as a proper device.
Because a man is self-employed and hires no one else, it does not
always mean that he thereby rid himself of worker responsibility and,
with it, union pressure. Certain New York garment manufacturers, for
example, who had always employed workers to do the cutting and
finishing of clothing, revised their methods of operating by doing the
cutting themselves and farmed out the finishing work to other less
responsible individuals who, in turn, hired the labor. The court held
that these self-employed parties, by contracting for the finishing of
garments with whomsoever they wished, just as effectively controlled
labor as if they actually employed the workers so were subject to
picketing.2
While the courts have gone a long way to protect the legitimate
interests of labor, they have been prone to oppose picketing where the
result of compliance with the union demand would, almost of necessity,
force the individual out of business. Such an illustration is provided
by the cases where the self-employed party offers to join the union
when approached but is not allowed to do so because of a union rule
against the employer doing the work. The union might or might not
have a legitimate grievance, but as the result of compliance with union
demands would force the self-employer out of business, since he would
20 Bakery & Pastry Drivers. etc. v. Wohl. 315 U. S. 769. 62 S. Ct. 816, 86 L. Ed.
1178 (1942); Reiner v. Sullivan. 3. N. Y. S. (2d) 77 (1942).
21 Abeles v. Friedman, 171 Misc. 1042. 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 252 (1939).
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have to hire a union worker to do the work he had himself performed,
picketing was restrained. 22 In one of the more recent cases of this type,
that of Bautista v. Jones,23 the court said: "Thus the question before us
does not relate to the right of the union to take measures reasonably
necessary to protect its members from unequal and unfair competition
but, instead, to the asserted right to make the possible evils of a system
the basis for complete deprivation of the opportunity of particular
individuals to work. '" 2
But even this situation must be contrasted
,with cases where others are employed, 25 for then the apparent difference
between the two lines of cases seems to lie in the fact that in the latter
the tendency of the union rule is not to drive the individual out of
business because he has shown himself able to employ others.
The preceding discussion merely illustrates what some courts have
deemed to be justifiable circumstances permitting union interference with
businesses conducted by self-employed parties. The cases must, of
necessity, be read with one eye on the period when they were rendered,
for the trend of the times is of the utmost importance. The earliest cases
held that such interference should not be tolerated without discussion
of other consequences. Cases permitting such picketing fall within a
period when public sympathy was concerned with the problems of the
laboring man and his union. At the present, the field of labor relations
is in a state of upheaval with accent on placing curbs on labor and unions.
It is, therefore, at least for the present, likely that courts will scrutinize
closely the conduct of unions in their relation, to business and might
again return to earlier trends, at least with respect to self-employed
individuals. The Taft-Hartley Act may have made its contribution in
this direction for it designates as unlawful the "forcing or requiring
[of] any employer or self-employed person to join any labor or employer
organization .. ."26 But whether the policy reflected thereby is temporary
or permanent is, to say the least, problematical.
W. A.

HEINDL

22 Bautista v. Jones. 25 Cal. (2d) 746. 155 P. (2d) 343 (1945), affirming 55 Cal.
App. (2d) 694, 131 P. (2d) 579 (1943); Roraback v. Motion Picture Machine
Operator's Union, 140 Minn. 481, 168 N. W. 766 (1918), rehearing denied 141 Minn.
140, 169 N. W. 529 (1918). See also Campbell v. Motion Picture Mach. Operators'
Union, 151 Minn. 220. 186 N. W. 781 (1922) : Jensen v. St. Paul Moving Picture
M. 0. L. Union, 194 Minn. 58, 259 N. W. 811 (1935).
23 25 Cal. (2d) 746. 155 P. (2d) 343 (1945), affirming 55 Cal. App. (2d) 694, 131
P. (2d) 579 (1943).
2425 Cal. (2d) 746 at 751. 155 P. (2d) 343 at 346.
25 Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union. 301 U. S. 468. 57 S. Ct. 857, 81 L. Ed.
1227 (1939): Glover v. Minneapolis Building Trades Council. 215 Minn. 533. 10
N. W. (2d) 481 (1943) ; Zaat v. Building Trades Council. 172 Wash. 445, 20 P. (2d)
589 (1933).
26 Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947. § 303(a) (1).
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LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-COMPUTATION OF PERIOD OF LIMITATIONWHETHER OR NOT ABSENCE FROM JURISDICTION AFTER ACCRUAL OF CAUSE OF
ACTION TOLLS RUNNING OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WHERE PLAINTIFF HAS
OTHER MEANS OF SECURING JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANT-In

the recent

Ohio case of Commonwealth Loan Company v. Firestine,' the plaintiff
received from the defendants a note dated in 1926. Default was made
in payment of the note in 1930 when the maker left a balance still due
and owing. In 1945, the plaintiff exercised the power conferred by a
cognovit clause contained in the note and had judgment entered against
the defendants.
The defendants then filed a motion to vacate that
judgment on the ground that the fifteen-year statute of limitations had

run against the claim.

The trial court found that, between 1930 ana

the date of the judgment, the defendants had resided in Illinois for a

period of approximately four years. Plaintiff therefore contended that,
as required by the local statute, this period of absence should be excluded
in computing the period of limitation. If it was, the action was clearly
not barred. Defendants nevertheless argued that the statutory exception
was only applicable where the plaintiff's relief depended upon the
personal presence of the defendant within the state whereas under this
particular note, because of the warrant of attorney, the plaintiff might
have obtained judgment at any time. The trial court refused to vacate
the judgment and its decision was affirmed in the intermediate appellate
court.2 The Supreme Court of Ohio also agreed with that result, stating
that the statute involved was clear and explicit and, as the defendants
came within the letter of the exception, the presence of a warrant of
attorney in the note made no difference.
The court pointed out the dearth of direct authority on this precise

question, citing only one case, an Illinois Supreme Court decision in the
case of Hibernian Banking Association v. Commercial National Bank,3
from which they quoted with approval. Research has turned up another
Illinois case which is in harmony. 4 The reasoning of both these Illinois
cases is founded on the same basis as that used in the instant decision;
namely, that the statute does not provide for a different conclusion if
there happens to be a cognovit clause. In fact, it was suggested that
to hold that the presence of such a clause would change matters would
be, in effect, to repeal the statute. The absence of authority is easily
explained. A creditor holding a note with a confession clause has a
1-

Ohio -, 73 N. E. (2d) 501 (1947).
Ohio App. -, 72 N. E. (2d) 912 (1946).
3 157 111. 524, 41 N. E. 919 (1895).
4 Mitchell v. Comstock, 305 111. App. 360. 27 N. E. (2d)
2--

620 (1940).
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convenient and inexpensive method of obtaining judgment against the
makers. He is, therefore, not likely to wait very long after default
has occurred before proceeding to a remedy.
The problem in the present case is, of course, narrow. It is, however,
part and parcel of a larger one, to-wit: should the statute of limitations
be tolled by the absence or non-residence of the defendant where, in
spite of such circumstance, the plaintiff by diligent effort could have
obtained relief before the local tribunals? In this discussion, interest
in the application of this problem is confined to actions in personam, but
it is also of importance to in rem proceedings. 5
Under the former category fall two types of situations other than
the one involved in the instant case. In each of these the defendant,
although absent from the state, is amenable to process either by some
form of substituted service which may be authorized by statute 6 or by
service upon some person, such as the Secretary of State, acting as the
non-resident defendant's duly appointed agent.7 The courts are in
disagreement as to whether or not either of these circumstances should
affect the operation of the exception. The main crux of the argiunent
is whether the courts should look into the spirit of the statute or whether
they should be confined to its express language. If the former, then
as long as the plaintiff can. obtain relief, the statute is not tolled. If
the latter, then the statute will only be tolled where the facts fall into
the exact language, and, therefore, the presence of any other method of
obtaining relief is of no consequence.
Vhere substituted service is possible, the present problem must be
further analyzed in the light of the language of the appropriate
limitation statute. Some statutes, like the one in Illinois, require that
in order for the exception to operate the defendant must "reside out
of" the state,' hence mere absence alone is not sufficient.' In the majority
5 See annotation in 119 A. L. R. 331 to the case of Herthel v. Barth, 148 Kas. 308,
81 P. (2d) 19 (1938).
6 See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 137.
Ibid., Ch. 95 , § 23.
8 Ibid., Ch. 83, § 19, for example, specifies that the limitation period is tolled
7

.. if, after the cause of action accrues, he departs from and resides out of the
state .... " Italics added.
9 Gray v. Fifield, 59 N. H. 131 (1879) ; Ward v. Cole, 32 N. H. 452 (1855) ; Gilman
v. Cutts, 27 N. H. 348 (1853) ; Malakoff v. Frye, 158 Misc. 171, 284 N. Y. S. 22
(1935), construing a Washington statute; State v. Furlong, 60 Miss. 839 (1883);
Dent v. Jones, 50 Miss. 265 (1874) : Miller v. Tyler, 61 Mo. 401 (1875) ; Venuci v.
Cademartory, 59 Mo. 352 (1875); Garth v. Robards, 20 Mo. 523, 64 Am. Dec. 203
(1855) ; State v. Allen, 132 Mo. App. 98, 111 S. W. 622 (1908) ; Bensley v. Haeberle,
20 Mo. App. 648 (1886) ; Rhodes v. Parish, 16 Mo. App. 430 (1885) ; Rutland Marble
Co. v. Bliss, 57 Vt. 23 (1885) ; Hall v. Nasmith, 28 Vt. 791 (1856) ; Crowder v.
Murphy, 61 Wash. 626, 112 P. 742 (1911).
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of cases, that result is just and equitable to all parties involved for where
an individual is merely temporarily absent from the state and has not
taken up residence elsewhere he will have a residence within the state
where substituted service may be had. The plaintiff thus having a
remedy, there is no need for the tolling of the statute. One can, of
course, envision a situation where the defendant abandons his residence
intending to establish a new one when he returns from a temporary sojourn
outside the state. Such a problem, apparently, would not be covered by
the express language of statutes in this category, but might be settled
by recourse to the idea that a residence is not abandoned merely by an
intention so to do but continues until a new one is established.
The prime conflict,, however, arises where the statute involved
merely mentions "absence" as the controlling factor in determining
whether or not the statute of limitations is tolled. Some courts have
said that language of that type is so clear that any absence would serve
even though substituted service might be had." ° As one court put it,
whether the "full or partial remedies of the law arc or are not
suspended by a resident of the state being temporarily out of the state,
cannot be considered in giving effect to the plain and unambiguous
language."11 Another court preferred to base its decision upon. the fact
that the exception to the statute of limitations was in existence long
before any statutory provision with regard to substituted service had
It logically pointed out that it could not have been
been enacted.2
within the contemplation of the legislature, at the time of enacting the
earlier of the two statutes, that the exception should not operate where
substituted service could be had. Courts which take the opposite view
under the same set of circumstances look rather to the spirit of the
They point out that the
statute and disregard the precise language."1
exception was enacted to prevent injustice and that where such injustice
can be forestalled by the plaintiff's own action he needs no special
protection.
The same conflict is present where the non-resident defendant is
amenable to process by the service thereof on his duly appointed agent.
10 Bauserman v. Blunt, 147 U. S. 647, 13 St. Ct. 466. 37 L. Ed. 316 (1890) ; Connor
v. Timothy, 42 Ariz. 517, 33 P. (2d) 293 (1934); Roth v. Holman, 105 Kas. 175,

182 P. 416 (1919) ; Conlon v. Lanphear, 37 Kas. 431, 15 P. 600 (1887) ; Fisher v.
Phelps, Dodge & Co., 21 Tex. 551 (1858): Keith-O'Brien Co. v. Snyder. 51 Utah 227,
169 P. 954 (1917), followed in Buell v. Duchesne Mercantile Co., 64 Utah 391, 231
P. 123 (1924).
1 Parker v. Kelly, 61. Wis. 552 at 557, 21 N. W. 539 at 540 (1884).
"2Anthes v. Anthes, 21 Ida. 305. 121 P. 553 (1912).
3Dorus v. Lyon. 92 Conn. 55, 101 A. 490 (1917) ; Sage v. Hawley, 16 Conn. 106,
41 Am. Dec. 128 (1844) : Penley v. Waterhouse. 1 Iowa 498 (1855) : Mune v. Taylor,
91 Ky. 461, 16 S. W. 128 (1891) : Blodgett v. Utley, 4 Neb. 25 (1875).
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Typical provisions of that character exist to cover situations where the
non-resident automobile operator uses the highways of the state and
thereby appoints some public official as his agent for service of process.
One line of authority holds, in such cases, that as the plaintiff has a
method of obtaining relief the mere fact that the defendant remains out
of the state does not toll the statute. 4 It has been said, in that regard,
that the "absence or non-residence of the defendants in no way obstructed or prevented suit against them or service upon them,"" and
a pertinent Illinois decision, that in the case of Nelson v. Richardson,6
follows much the same line of reasoning. The basis of the decision there
was that, even though the facts did not fall within the express language
of the exception, it must have been the intention of the legislature to
take this particular situation out of the exception. As the very purpose
for a non-resident driver provision is to give the plaintiff a speedy
method of obtaining relief not otherwise available, granting recognition
to the operation of this exception would be inconsistent therewith and
unnecessary. 7 Other jurisdiction, however, still feel bound by the express
language of the limitation statute and allow it to be tolled even though
the Secretary of State could be served as the agent of the non-resident
defendant.1 8 Decisions of that character seem to rest upon the fact that
it is the duty of the debtor to seek out his creditor and to pay him at
his residence so that it is not unreaonable to say that one violating his
duty by staying outside of the state should not have the benefit of a
statute of repose.
Courts which look to the spirit of the statute rather than to its
precise language would seem to have more reason back of their decisions.
If the original object of the statute of limitations and the purpose of
'4 Coombs v. Darling, 116 Conn. 643. 166 A. 70 (1933) : Nelson v. Richardson. 295
Ill. App. 504, 15.N. E. (2d) 17 (1938) : Arrowood v. McMinn County, 173 Tenn. 562,
121 S. W. (2d) 566 (1938). The same result is reached where an agent is expressly
appointed: Green v. Sunder, 114 Tenn. 100, 84 S. W. 808 (1904). For a discussion
as to foreign corporations doing business within the state see annotation in 59
A. L. R. 1336 to the case of Clawson v. Boston Acme Mines Develop. Co.. 72 Utah
137, 269 P. 147 (1928).
15 Arrowood v. McMinn County, 173 Tenn. 562 at 565. 121 S.WV. (2d) 56c) at 567.
16 295 Ill. App. 504, 15 N. E. (2d) 17 (1938).
17 Any difference between the decision in Nelson v. Richardson, 295 Ill. App. 504.
15 N. E. (2d) 17 (1938), and the two Illinois cases referred to in notes 3 and 4.
ante, would seem to depend on the existence of such a statute. In the earlier
decisions, cases which concerned the effect of a warrant of attorney, nothing
tangible could be shown which would indicate a legislative intent to take the case
out of the statutory exception. The converse was the case when the matter involved
a non-resident automobile driver.
18 Maguire v. Yellow Taxi Corporation, 253 App. Div. 249. 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 749

(1938),

affirmed in 278 N. Y. 576, 16 N. E. (2d)

110 (1938) : Bode v. Flynn, 213

Wis. 509. 252 N. W. 284 (1934). The Ohio Court of Appeals has recently decided to
the contrary: see Canaday v. Hayden, - Ohio App. -, 74 N. E. (2d) 635 (1947).
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the exception is kept in mind, it hardly seems possible that a legislature
would intend to have the statute suspended where that was unnecessary
as is the case where the rights of the parties can be protected by the
exercise of diligence.
W. A. HEINDL

WILLS-PROBATE,

ESTABLISHMENT,

AND

ANNULMENT-EFFECT

OF

ADMISSION OF FOREIGN WILL TO PROBATE ON RIGHT TO CONTEST WILL BY

DIRECT ATTACI---The case of Sternberg v. St. Louis Union Trust
Company' provides the first Illinois Supreme Court interpretation of the
provisions of Section 90 of the Illinois Probate Act - so far as they affect
the right to contest a foreign will which has been admitted to probate
in this state. The testator's will there concerned was made in Missouri
in 1937. He married in 1943 and died in that state in 1944 leaving no
issue. Under the Missouri statutes, 3 his will was not revoked by his
subsequent marriage since he left no issue of that marriage surviving
him, hence the will was admitted to probate in that state. An authenticated copy of the will was subsequently admitted to probate4 in Illinois
where testator had owned and left considerable real estate. The widow
thereafter renounced the will but the other heirs filed suit to contest
the same on the ground that the validity of the will, insofar as it affected
real estate located in Illinois, was determinable by Illinois law and that
the marriage of the testator subsequent to the execution of the will
had worked a revocation of it.' The executor, on the other hand, contended
that the present Illinois Probate Act had modified the common-law rule
to the point where a foreign will, valid where the testator was domiciled,
was likewise valid in Illinois and, when admitted to probate in this state,
was sufficient to pass title to real estate located there, any local provision
to the contrary notwithstanding. The circuit court held that the will was
valid insofar as it affected personal property located in Illinois but was
invalid to devise the real estate. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court
affirmed, holding that the common-law rule had been modified by the
Probate Act only to the extent that a foreign will might be admitted
to probate when executed in accordance with the law of the testator's
domicile, or in accordance with the law of the place where executed,
or where it had been admitted to probate in a foreign state, but that
'394

Ill. 452, 68 N. E. (2d) 892 (1946).

2II1. Rev. Stat. 1945. Ch. 3, § 242.

3 Mo. Rev. Stat. 1929, Ch. 1, §§ 521-2.
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 3, § 237 et seq.
5 Ibid., § 197.
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its operation and effect, after admission to probate, was to be determined
by local law.
While the problem settled by the court in the instant case is a new
one under the present Probate Act,6 it has arisen many times before
in the history of the probating of foreign wills. That which has caused
difficulty from time to time has been the erroneous belief that statutory
provisions, making a foreign will which was valid where executed
admissible to probate or good and available in law on recordation in
a stated manner, were to be treated as having the effect of making such
foreign will valid for all purposes, freeing it from attack either directly
or collaterally. This has, however, not been the case even under the
earliest provisions for the probate of foreign wills in the states whose
laws ultimately were adopted and became the law of Illinois.
Under English law, wills might be proved either in common form
or in solemn form. Under the first method, the will was brought before
the judge of the proper court and proved by its witnesses without notice
to interested parties. At any time within thirty years thereafter, however,
any interested person, by petition, could force the executor of the will
to again prove the will in solemn form, at which time notice was given
to all interested parties and all issues with reference to the validity of
the will were tried de novo. Probate established the validity for purpose
of transfer of personalty only; as to lands, probate had no significance.
Each time a devisee found it necessary to prove his claim to land, he
was obliged to prove the will anew, so the validity of the will could be
contested on every such occasion.
The early statutes of this country extended the validity of a probated
will to realty as well as to personalty by providing for a will contest
proceeding which was comparable to the reprobating of a will in England
in solemn form. The validity of a will might also be questioned in
chancery by direct attack.7 In 1789, at a time when Illinois was but
a county of Virginia, a law was passed in that state providing for the
proof of foreign wills, there having been no prior statute covering the
subject matter." It declared that such wills could be "contested and
controverted in the same manner as the original might have been."
This statute is the earliest direct antecedent of the present Illinois
provisions, and indicated an intent that the right to contest a foreign
will should be as broad as that concerned when a domestic will was
6

Ibid., § 151 et seq.

-Dibble v. Winter. 247 Il. 243, 93 N. E. 145 (1910) ; Luther v. Luther, 122 Ill.

558. 13 N. E. 166 (18S7) ; Rigg v. Wilton, 13 Ill. 15, 5 Am. Dec. 419 (1851).
also Horner, Probate Practice, 2d Ed., Ch. IV, § 58.

See

8 Abridgment Pub. Laws Va. (1796), p. 335, § 14. See also 4 Littel's Laws of Ky.,
Append. 2, p. 447. § 7.
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involved. It was followed by an enactment of the Governor and Judges
of the Northwest Territory, dated 1795, making allowance for the proving
of wills as well as the recording of foreign wills, which provided for the
contesting of wills "whereof copies or probates shall be as aforesaid
produced and given in evidence. '"9 Again there was evident intention
that some method should exist by which every will could be contested.
That statute was re-enacted for the Territory of Indiana, in 1807, when
10
the land now comprising the state of Illinois was a part thereof.
Subsequently, upon the organization of the Territory of Illinois in 1809,
these sections were re-enacted into Illinois law in 181-2.11
After the admission of Illinois as a state, provision was made for
the probate of both domestic and foreign will by language which seems
to have been borrowed substantially from the then Ohio statute."
Shortly thereafter, a probate court was established under a statute
wherein it was also pTovided that
interested may contest any wills . ..

".
.'

any person or persons
When the Illinois statutes

were revised in 1829, the provisions of the then Kentucky statute concerning the contest of wills, 4 which in turn had been based upon the
earlier Virginia statute, were included in the revision 5 and the other
provisions already noted were re-enacted.' 6 At that time, therefore,
foreign wills could be contested in precisely the same way as domestic
wills not only in Kentucky,' 7 Ohio,'" and Virginia 9 but apparently also
in Illinois. In 1855, the Illinois legislature adopted the Pennsylvania
proof of foreign will statute20 at a time when it had been held in that
state that foreign wills were contestible. 21 All these provisions remained
intact, with the exception of some inconsequential omissions or renumbering of the sections, 2 down to the passage of the present Probate Act.
9 See Maxwell, Laws of Northwest Territory, p. 148.
10 Terr. Laws Indiana, Aug. 1807 to Nov. 1811, pp. 84-8.

Pope's Laws of Illinois Territory, pp. 215-6.
Laws 1819, p. 231, §§ 22-3.
13 Laws 1821. p. 119. § 5.
11
12

14 Ky. Laws 1797. § 11 and § 15. See also Rigg v. Wilton, 13 Il.

15, 5 Am. Dec.

419 (1851).
1 Rev. Laws 1828-29, p. 193, § 5.

Ibid., p. 192, § 2 and § 7.
See 2 Morehead and Brown. Ky. Dig. 1834, p. 1544, § 13, and p. 1548, § 1.
18 Ohio Stats. 1824, p. 121, § 12.
19 1 Rev. Code Va. 1819, p. 379.
'0 Laws 1855, p. 44.
21 See Opp v. Chess, 204 Pa. 401. 54 A. 354 (1903).
22 Section 22 of the Act of 1819 became Section 2 of the Act of 1829, and remained
such; Section 23 of the Act of 1819 became Section 7 of the Act of 1829. but was
afterwards changed to Section 9 of the Wills Act: Section 5 of the Act of 1821
remained Section 5 in the Act of 1829 but later became Section 7 of the Wills Act.
All these provisions were repealed but became incorporated into the present Probate
Act.
16
'7
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One technical question did arise over the legislative intention because
the provision for the admission of foreign wills2 3 appeared in sequence
after the provision for will contests24 while that concerning the admission

of domestic wills2 5 preceded it. That question was resolved in the case
of Dibble v. Winter,2" wherein it was said that it would be unreasonable
to read a radical departure into the Illinois act and give foreign wills
greater force than domestic ones, for the court there held that foreign
wills were contestible in Illinois in like manner as domestic wills. It
can thus be seen that, from the earliest day until the passage of the
present Probate Act, foreign wills were open to contest here.
The language of the present Probate Act is clear on the question for
it states that "within nine months after the admission to probate of a
domestic or foreign will in the probate court of any county of this
state, any interested person may file a complaint in the circuit court of
the county in which the will was admitted to probate to contest the
validity of the will." ' 27

One of the framers thereof has stated that the

application of this section, both to foreign wills as well as to domestic
ones, is nothing more than a restatement and codification of the rule
of Dibble v. Winter and that while a successful constest here will have
no effect on the original probate it will serve to prevent the will from
operating on real estate located in this state. 28 It has, therefore, been held
that the grounds upon which a will may be contested are not in any way
restricted,29 so that if, for example, the writing offered as the will of
the decedent has been revoked, such fact will serve as a proper ground
3

for contest.

°

It now having been established, contrary to the contentions of the
executor in the instant case, that foreign wills admitted to probate in
Illinois are subject to contest, it still remains to be determined what
effect the marriage of the non-resident testator, subsequent to the execution
of the will -offered in probate, has upon the will for purpose of transferring title to the testator's lands located in this state. An established
principle of law, recognized everywhere and arising from the necessities
of the case, declares that the disposition of immovable property, whether
by deed, descent, or otherwise, is exclusively subject to the laws of the
23

Laws 1829, p. 193, § 7: Ill. Rev. Stats. 1937, Ch. 148, § 9.

24 Laws 1829, p. 193, § 5; Ill. Rev. Stats. 1937, Ch. 148, § 7.
25

Laws 1829, p. 192, § 2; Ill. Rev. Stats. 1947, Ch. 148. § 2.

26247 Ill.
243, 93 N. E. 145 (1910).
27 Il.
Rev. Stats. 1945, Ch. 3, § 242.
2s See Ill. Probate Act Ann., 1940, p. 95, § 90.
29 Shelby Loan & Trust Co. v. Milligan, 372 Ill. 397, 24 N. E. (2d) 157 (1939).
76, 113 N. E. 989 (1916).
so Dowling v. Gililand. 275 Ill.
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government within whose jurisdiction such property is situated."
This
principle extends to wills and governs not only the form and mode of
execution but also the power of the testator to make the devise or other
disposition of property.3 2 It applies to descent and heirship, so that
none can take except those who are recognized as legitimate heirs by
the lex rei sitae, and they take in the proportions and order which those
laws prescribe.3 3 In accordance with these principles, the validity of the
will offered for probate in the instant case was governed by the laws of
Illinois as to the real estate located there .and, by that law, the marriage
of the testator produced a revocation of any will made by him prior to
the date of that marriage.3 4 The only recognized exception to such rule,
established by statute, permits the will to survive if a contrary intention
is expressed by the testator therein,33 but such was not the fact in the
instant case. The decision, therefore, both on historic principles and
on clear legislative intent, is well founded.
R. C. MONTGOMERY

WILLS--RIGHTS

AND

LIABILITIES

WHETHER OR NOT WIDOW MAY

OF

DEVISEES

CLAIM STATUTORY

AND

SHARE IN

LEGATEES-CORPUS OF

remarkable doctrine on the subject of trusts was announced by the Suipreme Court of
Ohio in- the recent case of Harris v. Harris,' a suit brought by a widow
to have certain instruments executed by her deceased husband declared
not to be trusts or, if otherwise valid as trusts, to have the instruments
set aside to the extent necessary to permit her to receive her statutory
share in his estate. The settlor died testate without issue. Prior to his
death, he had purported to create a trust inter vivos over certain shares
of stock in a corporation of which he was president under which he
received the income for life and provided for an eventual disposition of
the trust res to the children of his brother. The widow was not named
REVOCABLE

31

TRUST

CREATED BY DECEASED

HUSBAND--A

United States v. Fox, 94 U. S. 315, 24 L. Ed. 192 (1877): Furhop v. Austin.
149. 52 N. E. (2d) 267 (1943) ; Hall v. Gabbert, 213 Ill. 208, 72 N. E. 806

385 Il1.

(1904).
32 Harrison v. Weatherby, 180 Ii1.
Ill. 243, 93 N. E. 145 (1910).
33

Stoltz v. Doering. 112 Il.

418, 54 N. E. 237 (1899); Dibble v. Winter, 247

234 (1885).

See also Story, Conflict of Laws, Ch.

XII, p. 823, § 483.
14 Ill. Rev. Stats. 1945,

Ch. 3, § 197.
See Kuhn v. Bartels, 374 Ill. 231, 29 N. E. (2d) 284 (1940) ; Lawman v. Murphy.
321 I1. 421, 152 N. E. 220 (1926) : Wood v. Corbln, 296 Il. 129. 129 N. E. 553
(1920) ; Hudnall v. Ham, 183 Ill. 486, 56 N. E. 172 (1900) ; MeAnnulty v. McAnnulty,
120 Il1. 26, 11 N. E. 397 (1887).
1 147 Ohio St. 437, 72 N. E. (2d) 378 (1947). Mathias, Hart and Zimmerman. JJ.,
35

dissented. Mathias, J., and Zimmerman, J., each wrote dissenting opinions.

CHICAGO-KENT

LA IV REVIEW

as a beneficiary. Under the terms of the trust instrument, the settlor
expressly reserved the unrestricted right to modify and revoke, but such
rights were never exercised. In addition, he reserved the right to deliver
additional securities or to take delivery of trust property which might
be the subject of revocation. The trustee was denied the power to sell,
had no right to invest or re-invest the trust assets, and was particularly
refused the right to vote the stock in. question. The trial court held the
trust to be valid in all respects and denied plaintiff's petition. The Ohio
Court of Appeals held that the trust was valid except that, because the
settlor had retained dominion and control over the corpus, the trust was
ineffective to deprive the widow of her interest in the assets thereof as
the surviving spouse. The Supreme Court of Ohio, by a divided court,
affirmed the decision for the plaintiff.
In support of its holding, the majority of the court stressed the fact
that, in spite of the trust agreement, the settlor had continued to serve
as president and director of the corporation in question and, until his
death, had made the same use of his property as he had done prior to
the execution of the trust agreement. It also pointed out that the trustee
had not attended meetings of the stockholders or board of directors and
at no time had he examined the books of the company. In short, the
majority felt that the trustee performed only a minor function. While
admitting that a husband could dispose of his personal property during
his lifetime without the consent of his wife and while recognizing that
the transfer of property to a trustee under an agreement whereby the
settlor reserves to himself the income during his life with the right to
amend or revoke is a perfectly proper and valid transaction, the majority
nevertheless concluded that if, by such an agreement, the settlor does
not part absolutely with dominion over the property, his widow may
elect to take a statutory share therein as if the same constituted a part
of the settlor's estate.
It is difficult to reconcile the opinion of the majority with existing
decisions. If a valid trust inter vivos had been created, title passed
immediately to the trustee and nothing remained in the settlor except
the right to revoke, alter, and amend the trust agreement. Thereafter,
in the event of the settlor's death, since title to the trust property was
already in the trustee, it would appear that no part of such trust res
would pass to the settlor's executor or administrator if the right of
revocation had not been exercised. On the other hand, if the transfer
was illusory only, then the purported trust would be invalid as to the
wife and others and the corpus thereof would be administered as part
of the settlor's estate for title had not passed. It is significant that no
fraud as to the wife was alleged or proven. The court merely based its
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decision on the fact that the settlor had not parted with absolute dominion
over the trust res.
In this connection, the court purportedly followed the decision in
the Ohio case of Bolles v. Toledo Trust Company,2 but as the trusts
involved in that case were testamentary in character that decision would
not have material application. It is significant, too, that the court
reached its decision despite an Ohio statute, mentioned in the opinion,
which reads: ".

.

. the creator of a trust may reserve to himself any

use of power, beneficial or in trust, which he might lawfully grant to
another, including the power to alter, amend, or revoke such trust and
such trust shall be valid as to all persons, except .

.

.

creditors of such

creator." 3 It should be pointed out, however, that the Ohio bar should
have been amply prepared for the present decision for a review of the
Ohio cases had already indicated that the upper court of that state has
consistently followed a vacillating and erratic course on the subject of
4
trusts and one which is generally opposed to the weight of authority.
The generally accepted rule in cases of this character was once stated
by a Pennsylvania court, in the case of Windolph v. Girard Trust
Company,' where the court said: "It is the settled law in this state,
as was the common law, that during his life a man may dispose of his
personal estate by voluntary gift or otherwise, as he pleases, and it is
not a fraud upon the rights of his widow and children .... The power arises

from the fact that he is the absolute owner and hence may make a gift,
declare a trust, or otherwise dispose of his personal property at his
pleasure. During his life, his wife and children have no vested interest
in his personal estate and hence they cannot complain of any disposition
he sees fit to make of it. Their right to his property attaches only at
his death."' And this is true even though the gift was made with the
intention and purpose of depriving the wife of her distributive share
of the husband's personalty at his death. 7 It has, therefore, been
held that the reservation of a life interest to the husband and some
2144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N. E. (2d) 381 (1944).
3 Page Ohio Gen. Code Ann., Vol. 6, Ch. 4, § 8617.
4 See Goldman and DeCamp, "When is a Trust not a Trust?", 16 U. of Cin. L.
Rev. 191 (1942).
5245 Pa. 349, 91 A. 634 (1914).
G245 Pa. 349 at 363. 91 A. 634 at 638.
7 Sturges v. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 152 Md. 654, 137 A. 378 (1927) : Kerwin v.
Donaghy, 317 Mass. 559, 59 N. E. (2d) 299 (1945) ; Brashears v. State ex rel.
Oklahoma Pub. Welfare Comnm'n. 194 Okla. 663, 154 P. (2d) 101 (1944) : Potter
Title & Trust Co. v. Braum, 294 Pa. 482. 144 A. 401 (1928).
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degree of control over the property would not defeat the transfer in
-trust if it was otherwise absolute in nature, 8 and a federal court has held
that where the husband created an irrevocable trust reserving the income
to himself for life his widow would have no interest in the trust estate. 9
But the general rule is otherwise when it appears that the gift is
merely a colorable device by means of which the husband makes an
apparent gift of his property but in reality continues to use and enjoy
the trust property during his lifetime and at the same time attempts to
deprive his wife of her property rights after his death. Such a transfer
is deemed to be a legal fraud on the rights of the wife and hence is
voidable at her election. 10 Illinois adopted this view in the case of
Smith v. Northern Trust Company," but that case is readily distinguishable from the instant one for there fraud as to the wife was alleged. In
addition, the Ohio court acknowledged the trust to be valid, while the
Illinois court declared it invalid because of the fraud on the wife. It
should be mentioned, however, that there is a minority group of cases
which achieve a result directly opposed to this general rule and uphold
12
trusts even when created in fraud of the wife's rights.
The concept that retention by the settlor of control over the trust
and the trust res may have an adverse effect on the purported transfer
was developed by the United States Supreme Court in the income tax
case of Helvering v. Clifford." In that case, the taxpayer had declared
himself trustee over certain securities owned by him, retaining for himself
wide powers of control over the corpus. The court held that the trust
was invalid for federal income tax purposes and stated: "In this case
we cannot conclude as a matter of law that respondent ceased to be
the owner of the corpus after the trust was created. .

.

. So far as

his dominion and control were concerned, it seems clear that the trust
did not effect any substantial change. In substance his control over the
8 Jones v. Somerville, 78 Miss. 269. 28 So. 940. 84 Am. St. Rep. 627 (1900) : Gentry
v. Bailey. 6 Gratt. (Va.) 594 (1850).
9 West v. Miller, 78 F. (2d) 479 (1935).
10 Burton v. Burton. 100 Colo. 567, 69 P. (2d) 307 (1937) ; Trader v. Trader. 48
Ida. 722, 285 P. 678 (1930) ; Kratli v. Booth, 99 Ind. App. 178, 191 N. E. 180 (1934) ;
Martin v.Martin, 282 Ky. 411. 138 S. W. (2d) 509 (1940) ; Merz v. Tower Grove
Bank & T. Co., 344 Mo. 1150. 130 S.W. (2d) 611 (1939) : In re Side's Estate, 119
Neb. 314, 228 N. W. 619 (1930) : Newman v. Dore, 275 N. Y. 371. 9 N. E. (2d) 966
(1937). See also 26 Am. Jur., Husband and Wife, § 198: 41 C. J. S., Husband and
Wife, p. 417.
1322 Ill.
App. 168. 54 N. E. (2d) 75 (1944), noted in 23 CHICAGo-KENT LAW
REvIEw 87.
12 Brown v. Fidelity Trust Co., 126 Md. 175, 94 A. 523 (1915) ; Rose v. Union
Guardian Trust Co., 300 Mich. 73, 1 N. W. (2d) 458 (1942) ; Beirne v. Continental
Equitable Title & Trust Co., 307 Pa. 570, 161 A. 721 (1932).
13309 U. S.331, 60 S.Ct. 554, 84 L. Ed. 788 (1939).
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corpus was in all essential respects the same after the trust was created
as before. The wide powers which he retained included for all practical
1
purposes most of the control which he as an individual would have.''
ts views, however, did not purport to establish that the trust was
invalid for other purposes under state law,15 and it has often happened
that wide divergencies exist between taxation principles and those which
control in other legal problems based on the same facts. While the Ohio
court in the instant case made no reference to the Clifford decision, one
is led to wonder if the court might not have been unconsciously influenced
thereby as the reasoning parallels that underlying the income tax decision.
If so, and if the views there promulgated should spread to other jurisdictions, income tax law may change state law instead of vice versa.
It might well be that in the instant case the Ohio court has achieved
a commendable result from the standpoint of public policy in that it
protects the surviving wife from becoming a possible charge upon the
state; but the rationale of the court permits the conclusion that the court
does not have a complete grasp of the fundamental legal principles
involved in a trust. Other courts, when setting trusts aside, have declared
them to be invalid. The Ohio court held the subject trust to be valid,
thereby indicating that title had passed and yet, at the same time, held
that the trust res should be administered as part of the settlor's estate,
thereby indicating that title had not passed. To say the least, the
decision introduces novel features into the law of trusts.
E. B. STROH

14309 U. S. 331 at 335, 60 S. Ct. 554, 84 L. Ed. 788 at 791.
15In that regard, see Barlett, "The Impact of State Law on Federal Income
Taxation," 25 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW 103 (1947), particularly p. 115.

